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TELLING THE TRUTH AND PAYING FOR IT: A
COMPARISON OF Two CASES-RESTRICTIONS ON
POLITICAL SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES
DavidS. Bogen·
Two cases decided last year appear to provide a stark contrast in
philosophy toward the basic human right of freedom of speech. In Australia,
the High Court held that the Commonwealth could punish a citizen who
encouraged voters to fill out the ballot in a manner that the government
wished to discourage, even though the method of voting was lawful. 1 In the
United States, the Supreme Court found that the State could not suppress
truthful information about a product in an attempt to reduce the demand for
its sale. 2 In other words, truthful statements encouraging lawful activity
were protected from a regulation of commercial speech in the United States
but not from a regulation of political speech in Australia.
Both countries have constitutional protections for speech. The First
Amendment secures freedom of speech from abridgment in the United
States. 3 In Australia, the High Court has implied freedom of political
discussion from constitutional provisions for representative government. 4 An
analysis of the two recent cases reveals similarities in the way each court
approaches the constitutional protection of freedom of speech, but a
fundamental difference in emphasis with respect to the status of the citizen.
I. Langer v. Commonwealth

Australia is the home of the "Australian ballot" -the secret ballot
which has gained wide acceptance throughout the world. In other respects
its voting system follows more controversial political theories. Australia has
instituted compulsory voting and requires the voters to rank all candidates in
order of preference from the most preferred to the least preferred.
A. The Compulsory Ballot
It is a criminal offense for a qualified voter to fail to vote in an election

* B.A. 1962, LL.B. 1965 Harvard University; LL.M. 1967 New York University
Law School. Professor of Law and T. Carroll Brown Scholar, University of Maryland School
of Law. The author wishes to thank George Winterton of the University of New South Wales
for his helpful notes.
1. Langer v. Commonwealth, 134 A.L.R. 400 (1996).
2. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. A.C.T.V. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.L.R. 577 (1992); Nationwide News Pty. Ltd.
v. Wills, 108 A.L.R. 681 (1992).
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for Commonwealth office in Australia without a valid and sufficient reason. 5
Citizens have a duty to participate in government. Compulsory voting
assures that elected officials are the preference of a majority of the
electorate, not just a majority of those who choose to vote.
The Australian system of compulsory voting could not be adopted in
the United States. It violates the commonly accepted understanding of the
First Amendment that government may not compel an affirmation of support.
The United States Supreme Court struck down a compulsory flag salute in
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 6 saying, "[i]f there is any fixed
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. " 7 Compulsory voting appears to force the citizen to speak and act
in support of political candidates in the election. This contradicts a basic
premise of United States free speech doctrine. As the Court said in Wooley
v. Maynard, 8 "the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking at all. " 9
The American view runs counter to the Australian vision of appropriate
protections for political choice. Although the Australian Constitution does
not specifically guarantee freedom of speech, it does provide for voter
choice. Members of the Commonwealth Parliament must be "directly
chosen by the people. " 10 Voters must have an opportunity to be informed to
make that choice. Thus the Australian High Court found an implied freedom
of political discussion in the Australian Constitution. 11 Even before this
implied freedom was recognized, Australian citizens used the electoral
provisions of the Constitution to challenge the compulsory voting laws.
Ernest Edward Judd, a Socialist Labour party member, contended that
the Commonwealth could not constitutionally deny him the ability to choose
not to support any candidate at all. Judd was convicted of violating the
compulsory voting requirement by failing to vote in a 1925 Commonwealth
senate election. 12 On appeal to the High Court he argued that the power for
Parliament "to make laws prescribing the method of choosing senators" 13 did

5. Commonwealth Electoral Act§ 245 (1918).
6. 319 u.s. 624,642 (1943).
7. /d.
8. 430 u.s. 705 (1977).
9. /d. at 714.
10. AUSTL. CONST. §§ 7 (senators), 24 (members ofthe House).
11. Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills, 108 A.L.R. 681 (1992); A.C.T.V. v.
Commonwealth, 108 A.L.R. 577, 596-97 (1992).
12. At that time the requirement was found in Section 128A of the Commonwealth
Electoral Act of 1918-1925.
13. AUSTL. CONST. § 9. The provisions for election to the House of Representatives
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not extend to compulsory voting. Noting that his party did not participate in
the federal election because of the costs to get its candidates on the ballot,
Judd complained that all the candidates on the ballot supported capitalism.
It would betray his principles and those of his party to vote for any of them.
Forcing him to vote, he said, denied him his choice.
In Judd v. McKeon, 14 the Australian High Court upheld the compulsory
voting law. As long as choice exists, a voter's dislike of the choices or how
they are to be made does not matter. The joint opinion of three justices
interpreted "choosing" to refer to a selection between available options. The
requirement of a choice would be satisfied even if all the alternatives were
undesirable. 15 Two other justices agreed. One of them, Justice Isaac Isaacs
said, "[t]he compulsory performance of a public duty is entirely consistent
with freedom of action in the course of performing it." 16 Justice Isaacs noted
that the compulsory system would be undermined if dislike of the candidates
served as an excuse for not going to the polls. 17
The compulsory ballot does not prevent Australians like Judd from
arguing against the system of compulsory voting or stating that all the
candidates are abominable. The requirement prevents elections from going
by default to the candidate with the most intense supporters (i.e., those
motivated to come to the polls) rather than with the most supporters. It
makes the vote not just a right, but also a duty which the citizen owes to the
Commonwealth. As in the case of the military draft, the law exempts
religious conscientious objectors, but not persons simply opposed to the
current political situation.
Only Justice Henry Bournes Higgins dissented from the decision in
Judd. He did not question the constitutional power of Parliament to require
compulsory voting, but reasoned that scruples of opposition were a "valid
and sufficient reason" under the provisions of the statute for refusing to
vote. 18
B. The Voting Preference System
Australian elections use a preference system of voting in which the
voter casts a vote for all the candidates in order of preference. With respect
to Commonwealth elections, Section 240 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act
of 1918 provides:

do not specifically refer to choice. /d.§§ 31, 5l(xxxvi) (members of the House).
14. 38 C.L.R. 380 (1926).
15. /d. at 383 (Knox, C.J., Gavan Duffy & Starke, JJ.).
16. /d. at 385 (Isaacs, J.).
17. /d. at 386 (Isaacs, J.).
18. /d. at 387-89 (Higgins, J .).
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In a House of Representatives election a person shall mark
his or her vote on the ballot-paper by:
(a) writing the number 1 in the square opposite the name
of the candidate for whom the person votes as his or
her first preference,
(b) writing the numbers 2, 3, 4 (and so on, as the case
requires) in the squares opposite the names of all the
remaining candidates so as to indicate the order of
the person's preference for them. 19
The underlying rationale for this method of voting is to assure that the
winning candidate is the preference of the majority of the voters. That does
not always happen where voters vote for a single candidate. For example,
when third party candidates run, the voting system in the United States can
result in a candidate being elected with a plurality although most of the
voters preferred another candidate. This might have occurred if most of
those who voted for the candidate with the least votes (e.g., Independent
Ross Perot) preferred a second candidate (e.g., Republican George Bush)
over the candidate who received the most votes (e.g., Democrat Bill
Clinton).
The Australian system avoids the plurality election problem. The
winning candidate must receive a majority of the preferences of the voters.
To achieve this when no single candidate has a majority of the first
preferences, a process of exclusion and recalculation is used. The candidate
with the fewest first place votes is excluded, and the second place candidate
on those ballots is treated as the preference of the voter. This process of
exclusion and ballot recalculation is continued until there are only two
candidates left or one candidate has a majority. 20
The voting preference system was the focus of Jurgen Henry
Faderson's challenge to his conviction for failure to vote in a senate election.
He tried a variant on the statutory route suggested by Justice Higgins in
Judd. Faderson contended that he had a valid and sufficient reason for not
voting within the meaning of the statute because he had no preference among
the candidates. Unlike Judd who opposed voting for any of the candidates,
Faderson argued that he not only opposed them but also that he could not
distinguish among them.
The statutory argument failed in the 1971 case of Faderson v.
Bridger. 21 The Court denied the premise that the voter could not distinguish
between candidates. Chief Justice Sir Geoffrey Barwick said, "[t]o face the

19. Commonwealth Electoral Act§ 240 (1918).
20. /d. § 274.
21. 126 C.L.R. 271 (1971).
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voter with a list of names of persons, none of whom he may like or really
want to represent him and ask him to indicate a preference among them does
not present him with a task that he cannot perform. "22 Everyone is different.
Even a candidate list that consists of Hitler, Jack the Ripper, Pol Pot, and
Satan can be ranked in order of preference. 23 Relying on Judd, and
particularly relying on Justice Isaacs' opinion in that case, Chief Justice
Barwick upheld the conviction. If inability to distinguish among the
candidates were accepted as grounds to refuse to vote, he contended, it
would undermine the entire compulsory voting system.
Judd and Faderson made it clear that compulsory voting was
consistent with the Australian Constitution. But the criminal law only
required the voter to come to the polling place, take a ballot into the booth,
and deposit it in the ballot box. "Of course there is no offense committed by
not marking the ballot paper in such a fashion that the elector's vote is in law
a valid vote. " 24
The secret ballot enabled the voter opposed to the system to turn in a
blank ballot without being punished. Indeed, that is just what some
government critics urged-and that set the stage for the case decided by the
High Court of Australia this past term.
C. Ballot Provisions-The Prohibition Against Encouraging Voters to
Disregard Instructions
There is no criminal penalty for failing to vote in the manner
prescribed by Section 240. There couldn't be, because the hallot is secret.
The primary sanction for failure to follow instructions is that the ballot will
be invalid or, as it is popularly termed in Australia, "informal." Not every .
ballot that fails to follow Section 240 is informal. The Electoral Act enables
election officials to count ballots where a voter neglected to fill in a space or
mistakenly ranked two candidates alike. Under Section 268(1), a single
blank space will be deemed the voter's last preference. 25 Under Section
270(2), a ballot will be counted if it identifies a candidate as the first
preference and has numbers in the squares next to the other candidates or all
the other candidates but one. 26

22. !d. at 273.
23. My current preferences, subject to change with further information, are: (1) Jack the
Ripper, (2) Pol Pot, (3) Hitler, and (4) Satan.
24. Faderson, 126 C.L.R. at 272.
25. Commonwealth Electoral Act§ 268(1) (1918).
26. /d. § 270(2). Under the Commonwealth Electoral Act:
(2) Where a ballot paper in a House of Representatives election in which
there are 3 or more candidates:
(a) has the number 1 in the square opposite to the name of a candidate;
HeinOnline -- 7 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 115 1996-1997
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These provisions enable voters to avoid the expression of any
preference for secondary candidates by marking a "1" for the candidate of
choice and "2" for all others, since a repeated number is disregarded.
Although a ballot which voted for a single candidate would be invalid in an
election with more than two candidates, a voter can effectively cast a ballot
for one candidate and ignore all others by giving the others the same
preference number.
Thus, the attempt to save the vote of the voter who made a mistake
created a potential loophole for a single candidate voting procedure. In the
long run, this could prevent any candidate from getting a majority of the
preference votes. The Australian Electoral Commission commented on the
difficulty of retaining the safety valve for people who make a genuine
mistake while avoiding de facto optional preferential voting. They suggested
that one method for dealing with this was to penalize individuals who induce
people to fill out the ballot paper other than in accord with instructions. The
Commonwealth Parliament responded in 1992 by enacting a new provision,
Section 329A, which imposed a penalty of six months in prison for its
violation:
A person must not, during the relevant period in relation to a
House of Representatives election under this Act, print, publish
or distribute, or cause, permit or authorise to be printed,
published or distributed, any matter or thing with the intention of
encouraging persons voting at the election to fill in a ballot paper
otherwise than in accordance with section 240. 27

(b) has other numbers in all the other squares opposite to the names of

candidates or in all those other squares except one square that is left blank;
and
(c) but for this subsection, would be informal by virtue of paragraph
268(1)(c);
then:
(d) the ballot-paper shall not be informal by virtue of that paragraph;
(e) the number 1 shall be taken to express the voter's first preference;
(f) where numbers in squares opposite to the names of candidates are in a
sequence of consecutive numbers commencing with the number 1-the
voter shall be taken to have expressed a preference by the other number,
or to have expressed preferences by the other numbers, in that sequence;
and
(g) the voter shall not be taken to have expressed any other preference.
(3) In considering for the purposes of subsection (1) or (2), whether
numbers are in a sequence of consecutive numbers, any number that is
repeated shall be disregarded.
ld. §§ 270(2)-270(3).
27. Id. § 329A(l). Section 27 of the Electoral and Referendum Amendment Act of 1992
inserted Section 329A in the Commonwealth Electoral Act of 1918.
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D. The Decision of the Australian High Court

The constitutionality of Section 329A came before the High Court in
Langer v. Commonwealth. 28 Albert Langer regarded the existing political
system as fundamentally wrong. He acknowledged that Judd and Faderson
precluded him from urging voters not to go to the polls. Instead, he urged
voters to oppose the system by turning in a blank or informal ballot.
Langer argued that voters must be free to exercise their "choice" for
members of the House of Representatives under Section 24 of the
Constitution by turning in blank ballots to show that the voter does not
choose any of the candidates. Since the voter must be free to fill out the
ballot in a manner different from the instructions in Section 240, Langer
argued he should be free to encourage them to do so. Therefore, he
contended, Section 329A was unconstitutional.
Langer's basic argument ran contrary to the reasoning of the Court in
the earlier cases. The High Court had stated in tqose decisions that the
constitutional requirements of choice were satisfied by alternative candidates
on the ballot and that voting is a civic duty that can be compelled. All the
justices in Langer agreed that the mandatory language of Section 240 was
constitutional.
Langer stressed the argument on the constitutionality of Section 240
because his underlying concern was to encourage voters to oppose the
electoral system, and he realized that he had no chance of persuading the
Court to strike down a law that forbade encouraging persons to violate
another valid law. But Section 329A applied even if the defendant had urged
something lawful. Unlike Section 240, Section 329A punished speech. That
suggested the possibility that it would violate the implied freedom of political
communication.
The High Court had found Commonwealth laws
unconstitutional where they prohibited the criticism of government bodies29
or restricted political advertising. 30 The implied freedom even affected
defamation actions brought by high public officials under the common law
or state statutes. 31 Thus, while Langer did not press the implied freedom
argument, it was relevant to his case.
One Justice thought that the Commonwealth could not constitutionally
punish persons who encouraged voters to cast valid ballots that did not

28. 134 A.L.R. 400 (1996). Justice Deane reserved the question of the constitutionality
of Section 329A for decision by the High Court. Deane was elevated to the position of
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia before the decision in the case. The new
justice, Michael Kirby, took his seat after argument in Langer's case. Thus, only six judges
gave their opinions in this case.
29. Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills, 108 A.L.R. 681 (1992).
30. A.C.T.V. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.L.R. 577 (1992).
31. Theophanous v. Harold & Weekly Times Ltd., 124 A.L.R. I (1994).
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follow statutory directions. Although Justice Sir Darryl Dawson had
dissented in the cases which found an implied right of freedom of political
discussion, he found that Section 329A violated Section 24 of the
Commonwealth Constitution. He said the provision for members of the
House of Representatives to be chosen by the people required that voters
have a genuine choice. "[T]hose eligible to vote must have available to them
the information necessary to exercise such a choice. " 32
Justice Dawson indicated that government could legitimately punish
persons who encourage others to cast an informal vote "because the casting
of a formal, and therefore, effective, vote is in the interests of representative
government. " 33 However, the savings provisions in Sections 268 and 270
made it possible to cast a valid ballot that does not conform to the directions
of Section 240. Taken together, these provisions make available optional or
selective preferential voting as opposed to full preferential voting.
To prohibit communication of this fact (or at any rate
communication in the form of encouragement) is to restrict the
access of voters to information essential to the formation of the
choice required by s 24 of the Constitution. Thus, s 329A has
the intended effect of keeping from voters an alternative method
of casting a formal vote which they are entitled to choose under
the Act. 34
Justice Dawson concluded that Section 329A was not reasonably and
appropriately adapted to provide for members directly chosen by the
people. 35
It is a law which is designed to keep from voters information
which is required by them to enable them to exercise an informed
choice. It can hardly be said that a choice is an informed choice
if it is made in ignorance of a means of making the choice which
is available and which a voter, if he or she knows of it, may wish
to use in order to achieve a particular result. 36

32. Langer v. Commonwealth, 134 A.L.R. 400, 411 (1996) (Dawson, J.).
33. ld. at 412 (Dawson, J.). In a related case, Dawson voted to sustain a South
Australian law that prohibited encouraging voters to mark their ballots in state elections other
than as directed. Muldowney v. South Australia, 70 A.L.J.R. 515 (1996). "Unlike the
situation in Langer, s 126(1) does not have the aim of discouraging electors from exercising
an option which is available to them in the casting of a formal vote but is designed to ensure
that electors are not encouraged to cast an ineffective vote." ld. at 521 (Dawson, J .).
34. Langer, 134 A.L.R. at 411 (Dawson, J.).
35. ld.
36./d.
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Despite the force of Dawson's arguments, the remaining five justices
held the law constitutional. According to the majority, the savings
provisions were designed to minimize the exclusion of ballots, not to provide
an alternative method of voting. Encouraging people to fill out a ballot in
a different manner undermined the operation of the preferential system. The
wisdom and propriety of such a system remain open to full discussion; it is
the encouragement to act in a way that impairs its desireq operation that the
statute forbids.
Chief Justice Sir Gerard Brennan wrote that "the savings provisions do
not detract from the power to enact s 329A in order to protect what the
parliament intends to be the primary method of choosing members of the
House of Representatives. "37 He argued that the savings provisions did not
prescribe an alternative method of voting but merely saved from invalidity
some ballot papers which deviated from the prescribed method. "The
restriction on freedom of speech imposed by s 329A is not imposed with a
view to repressing freedom of political discussion; it is imposed as an
incident to the protection of the s 240 method of voting. " 38
Justices John Toohey and Mary Gaudron recognized that the purpose
of the law appeared to be to limit the possibility of voters deliberately taking
advantage of the savings provisions so as to express a preference for only
some of the candidates. This "assists in the maintenance of a system of full
preferential voting. " 39 The law, they concluded, was valid because it
furthered the democratic process.
Although the provisos operate to give effect to a ballot paper
which might otherwise be informal, the democratic process is
enhanced if a voter's actual intention is capable of ascertainment
from the ballot paper and effect is given to that intention rather
than an intention which he or she is deemed to have expressed.
In relation to ballot papers which fall within the provisos to s
268(l)(c), s 329A operates to proscribe conduct which might
encourage voters to fill in their ballot papers in a way that does
not make their intentions manifest. Because it operates in this
way, it is reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and
adapted to the enhancement of the democratic process. 40
Justice Michael McHugh read Section 240 as giving directions to
voters on how they are to discharge the statutory duty to vote, but not

37.
38.
39.
40.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

at 405
at 406
at 415
at 419

(Brennan, C.J.).
(Brennan, C.J.).
(Toohey & Gaudron, JJ.).
(Toohey & Gaudron, JJ.).
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imposing a legal duty on the voter to vote in that manner. Nevertheless,
failure to follow those directions threatened the preferential system of voting.
"The system is as effectively undermined by filling in a ballot paper in a way
that does not indicate the voter's complete order of preferences as it is by a
vote that is wholly informal. " 41 Although there were savings clauses for
particular ballots, there was only one way to vote according to the
legislature's direction. Promoting that method did not violate the freedom
of discussion implied by Section 24 of the Constitution. "There is a world
of difference between prohibiting advocacy that is put forward with the
intention of encouraging breaches of statutory directions and prohibiting
advocacy that criticises or calls for the repeal of such directions. " 42
Finally, Justice William Gummow said that the savings provisions of
Sections 268 and 270 were ancillary to the primary objective of the
legislation "and do not evince any legislative intent to make optional or
selective preferential voting available as an alternative to full preferential
voting. " 43 He found no violation of an implied freedom of discussion
derived from the system of representative government. "Section 329A does
not impose any restriction upon political discussion generally nor, more
particularly, upon discussion as to the suitability or disadvantages in the
voting system. Rather, it is directed at the particular processes or
mechanism by which the franchise is exercised and the vote is cast. "44 He
concluded that the law was valid because the primary objective of the system
.established by the legislation involved observ'ance of the constitutionally
proper directions of Section 240. "It cannot be inimical to representative
government to forbid intentional conduct comprising advocacy of the casting
of a vote in such a way as may be an ineffective exercise of the franchise. " 45
In summary, a majority of the High Court held that the Commonwealth
could discourage people from voting in a manner that was lawful but
undesirable by punishing anyone who encouraged voters to act in that
manner. The law served the legitimate purpose of supporting the system of
full preference voting.
II. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island

Unlike Australia where the protection for speech is implied from the
political process and limited to speech concerning political matters, 46 in the

41. /d. at 422 (McHugh, J.).
42. Id. at 423 (McHugh, J.).
43. /d. at 430 (Gummow, J.).
44. Id. at 431 (Gummow, J.).
45. /d. at 431-32 (Gummow, J.).
46. "[S]peech which is simply aimed at selling goods and services and enhancing profitmaking activities will ordinarily fall outside the area of constitutional protection."
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United States, the Supreme Court has found that the First Amendment·
guarantee of freedom of speech applies to commercial speech. 47 Only a few
months after the Australian High Court upheld the prohibition against
encouraging voters to disregard election voting instructions, the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated a state prohibition on advertising liquor prices.
A. The Problem of Alcohol
The immoderate consumption of alcohol creates major social
problems-from drunk driving to domestic abuse to health problems. Taken
in moderation, however, alcohol may have some benefits. In any event,
most people want to be able to consume alcohol, and its prohibition creates
significant social problems. Thus, the Eighteenth Amendrnent, 48 which
prohibited the sale of alc<?hol, was repealed fourteen years later by the
Twenty First Amendment. 49
State governments have the power to ban the sale of alcohol or limit
the amount which may be sold, but the former directly contradicts the desires
of the political majority, and the latter imposes a costly bureaucratic scheme
that the average voter would likely fmd intrusive. An alternative method for
reducing alcohol consumption is to make it expensive-by increasing taxes
or fixing prices. Higher taxes, however, are usually unpopular, and both
higher taxes and fixed prices may harm a small state economically by
diverting purchasers to lower priced liquor stores in neighboring states.
Rhode Island took a different route. It prohibited the publication or
broadcast of any advertisements that made reference to the price of any
alcoholic beverages, including advertisements for stores outside the State.
The statute declared that the ban was for "the promotion of temperance and
for the reasonable control of the traffic in alcoholic beverages. " 50 The
theory was that the advertising ban would reduce price competition and that
the resulting higher prices for alcohol would reduce the purchases, and thus,
the consumption.

Theophanous v. Harold & Weekly Times, 124 A.L.R. 1, 14 (1994) (Mason, C.J., Toohey &
Gaudron, JJ.).
47. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1505 (1996). Although the
Court has found commercial speech protected by the First Amendment, Justice Scalia said he
followed precedent only because the parties failed to thoroughly brief the underlying issue of
whether commercial speech is protected. ld. at 1515 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia
appears to be the only current Justice who questions the application of the First Amendment
to commercial speech.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XVill.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
50. R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 3-1-5 {1987).
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The Legal Background for Regulation of Commercial Speech

Despite earlier indications that commercial speech (i.e., proposals or
encouragement to enter a commercial transaction) was not constitutionally
protected, the Supreme Court held in 1975 that commercial speech was
entitled to First Amendment protection.~ The following year, in Virginia
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council ,52 the Court struck
down a ban on advertising the prices for prescription drugs as abridging the
freedom of speech. The Court developed a framework for analyzing the
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm 'n of N.Y. 53 In that case, the Court said
that for commercial speech to come within the First Amendment, "it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. "54 Where the
commercial speech does come within the First Amendment, the Court must
determine whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. 55 If so,
the court "must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest. "56
· The Court struck a deferential stance toward the decision of the
legislature to regulate commercial speech in Posadas de P.R. Associates v.
Tourism Co. of P.R. 51 There the Court upheld a prohibition on a gambling
room advertising or offering such gambling facilities to the public of Puerto
Rico. Puerto Rico wanted the revenues from operating casinos for tourists
but feared the social costs of allowing its own residents to gamble. The
Supreme Court said that the reduction of demand for casino gambling by the
residents of Puerto Rico was a substantial state interest which was directly
advanced by the advertising prohibition and that the legislature of Puerto
Rico could determine that a restriction on advertising was more effective in
reducing demand than was the "counterspeech" of anti-gambling
commercials. 58 The Court suggested that the greater power to completely
ban casino gambling necessarily included the lesser power to ban casino
advertising:
1

It would just as surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which

would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a

51.
52.
53.
54.

Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
425 u.s. 748 (1976).
447 u.s. 557 (1980).
ld. at 566.

55./d.
56. ld.

57. 478 u.s. 328 (1986).
58. !d. at 344.
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product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to
forbid the stimulation of demand . . . through advertising on
behalf of those who would profit from such increas~d demand. 59
Rhode Island reasoned that this case supported its ban on advertising liquor
prices.

C. The Decision of the United States Supreme Court
Rhode Island statutes prohibiting the advertisement of liquor prices, 60
and the State's implementing regulations, were challenged in a lawsuit
brought by People's Super Liquor Stores, Inc., a Massachusetts liquor
retailer which sold to Rhode Island customers, and 44 Liquor Mart, Inc., a
Rhode Island liquor store. 61 The District Court judge found as a fact that
"Rhode Island's off-premises liquor price advertising ban has no significant
impact on levels of alcohol consumption in Rhode Island. " 62 He concluded
that the ban was unconstitutional because the State did not meet its burden
of demonstrating a reasonable fit between its policy objectives and its chosen
means. 63 The United States Court of Appeals reversed the District Court on
the grounds that the State could reasonably determine that competitive price
advertising would lower prices and result in more sales. 64 In 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode lsland, 65 the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
decision and unanimously invalidated the Rhode Island statutes. The
decision was not surprising because the ban reeked of liquor store lobbying
to secure noncompetitive profit levels rather than concern for the social
interest in limiting alcohol sales. But the justices went further by effectively
repudiating Posadas. Yet within this unanimous holding, the opinions were
fractured.
In holding the statute unconstitutional, Justice John Paul Stevens said,
"[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations
that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be
their own good. " 66 Acknowledging the propriety of protecting .consumers
from deceptive or misleading commercial speech, Justice Stevens
nevertheless observed that "when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination
of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 346.
R.I. GEN. LAws§§ 3-8-7, 3-8-8.1 (1987).
44 Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Racine, 829 F. Supp. 543 (D.R.I. 1993).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 555.
44 Liquorrnart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 39 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1994).
116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
Id. at 1508 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.).
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preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart
from the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands. " 67
He said that the State failed to meet its burden to show that the regulation
would advance its interest in promoting temperance by significantly reducing
alcohol consumption. 68 Citing alternatives such as higher taxes and direct
regulation of sales as well as educational campaigns, he added that the State
could not satisfy the requirement that the restriction on speech be no more
extensive than necessary. 69 Stevens concluded that the State failed to
establish a "reasonable fit" between its abridgment of speech and its
temperance goal "even under the less than strict standard that generally
applies in commercial speech cases. " 70 He then referred to "the more
stringent constitutional review that Central Hudson itself concluded was
appropriate for the complete suppression of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech. " 71
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence in which
she was joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices David Souter
and Steven Breyer. She insisted that the Court should apply the Central
Hudson test, implying that the reference in Justice Stevens' opinion to "the
more rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands" was
inappropriate. 72 · She argued that the Rhode Island law failed the fourth
prong-"that is, its ban is more extensive than necessary to serve the State's
interest. " 73 Justice O'Connor said this element of the Central Hudson test
required that the law be proportionate: "There must be a fit between the
legislature's goal and method, 'a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one
whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.' " 74
Justice O'Connor's opinion elaborated on the proportionality test used
for commercial speech. The fit between means and end must be narrowly
tailored, and the state must reasonably target the scope of the restriction on
speech to address the harm the state intends to regulate. In its regulation, the
state must carefully calculate the costs and benefits associated with the
burden on speech imposed by its prohibition. Less burdensome alternatives
to reach the stated goal indicate that the fit between means and ends may be

67. /d. at 1507 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ .).
68. /d. at 1509 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ.).
69. /d. at 1510 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.).
70. /d. (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.).
71. /d. (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.).
72. /d. at 1521-23 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ.,
concurring).
73. /d. at 1521 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ.,
concurring).
74. /d. (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring)
(quoting Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).
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too imprecise.
On the other hand, if alternative channels permit
communication of the restrictive speech, the regulation is more likely to be
considered reasonable. 75
Justice O'Connor saw no reasonable fit between Rhode Island's goal
of reduced consumption and the method of banning price advertising. The
Rhode Island law totally barred communication of price information outside
the store. If Rhode Island wanted to discourage consumption by higher
prices, higher taxes or minimum prices would more directly accomplish this
goal without burdening speech. 76
Rhode Island relied on the deference to legislative decisions that the
Court had shown in Posadas, but both Stevens' and O'Connor's opinions
repudiated that deference. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Anthony
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concluded that
Posadas was wrong:
The casino advertising ban was designed to keep truthful,
nonmisleading speech from members of the public for fear thaf
they would be more likely to gamble if they received it. As a
result, the advertising ban served to shield the State's
antigambling policy from the public scrutiny that more direct,
nonspeech regulation would draw ....
. . . Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was "up to
the legislature" to choose suppression over a less speechrestrictive policy. . . .
Instead, . . . we conclude that a state legislature does not
have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading
information for paternalistic purposes that the Posadas majority
was willing to tolerate. 77
The Court denied that government could ban commercial speech simply
because government could prohibit the underlying conduct. Where the
conduct is lawful, truthful, and nonmisleading, speech encouraging that
conduct is protected by the First Amendment.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Souter and Breyer, also repudiated the degree of deference in Posadas. She
said that the Court had subsequently engaged in more searching examination
of the fit between means and end: "The closer look that we have required
since Posadas comports better with the purpose of the analysis set out in

75. !d. (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
76. !d. at 1521-22.
77. !d. at 1511 (Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ.).
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Central Hudson, by requiring the State to show that the speech restriction
directly advances its interest and is narrowly tailored. " 78
Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he said
that the government has no legitimate interest in keeping "users of a product
or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the
marketplace. " 79 He objected to Stevens' opinion on the grounds that the
advancement of state interest test suggested that the restriction would have
been upheld if the State had been more successful in keeping consumers
ignorant and thus more effective in manipulating their decisions. 80 But
Thomas said that the majority of the justices would effectively reach his
position as a result of the way in which both the Stevens and the O'Connor
opinions applied the fourth element of the Central Hudson test-whether the
restriction of speech is more extensive than necessary to serve the
government interest:

The opinions would appear to commit the courts to striking down
restrictions on speech whenever a direct regulation (i.e., a
regulation involving no restriction on speech regarding lawful
activity at all) would be an equally effective method of
dampening demand by legal users. But it would seem that
directly banning a product (or rationing it, taxing it, controlling
its price, or otherwise restricting its sale in specific ways) would
. virtually always be at least as effective in discouraging
consumption as merely restricting advertising regarding the
product would be, and thus virtually all restrictions with such a
purpose would fail the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test. 81
The justices seem to have wilfully blinded themselves to the economic
impact of the alternatives they suggested. Either higher taxes or minimum
prices could seriously impair the economic viability of Rhode Island liquor
stores. Residents could easily cross the state lines of the nation's tiniest State
and buy cheaper booze in Massachusetts at stores like People's. If the state
cannot consider the undesirable side effects of alternative measures of
reducing consumption, Thomas might be right in suggesting that the effect
of this case forbids states from banning truthful nonmisleading speech in an
attempt to dampen demand for lawful commercial transactions.
On the other hand, the Rhode Island law left sellers free to advertise
liquor as insistently and seductively as possible to stoke demand for the
78. I d.
concurring).
79. ld.
80. ld.
81. ld.

at 1522 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Souter & Breyer, II.,
at 1515-16 (Thomas, J., concurring).
at 1518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
at 1519 (Thomas, 1., concurring).
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product. Banning price advertisements benefits liquor sellers that charge
noncompetitive high prices, and this direct effect suggests that enhancing
these sellers' profits was the law's objective. The existence of alternative
means to obtain high prices may have been simply makeweights in the
justices' calculations which helped them to realize that the objective of the
law was private gain, not public health.
III. Comparing the Cases

Despite the differences in result, the courts' analyses exhibit substantial
similarities. For example, both required a speech restriction to be justified
by a narrowly tailored law that serves an important government interest.
The United States Supreme Court, like the Australian High Court,
apparently permits speech restriction as a way to diminish the incidence of
a lawful activity encouraged by that speech. The Court in Liquormart did
not deny the legitimacy of restricting speech to discourage certain lawful
activities, despite the Court's substantial skepticism about whether the
restriction was necessary. Justice Thomas concurred separately to disavow
the other justices' acceptance of Central Hudson's proposition that reducing
consumption could be an important interest that would justify speech
restrictions. The state's interest, however, must be in reducing consumption
and not in affecting views on whether consumption should be reduced.
Australian courts, like those of the United States, judge the validity of
the statute in light of the availability of alternatives to achieve the state
interest without affecting speech. The United States Supreme Court struck
down the Rhode Island law because the justices found that the State could
have pursued its legitimate interests with other alternatives. The prohibition
of liquor price advertising was an unreasonable means of reducing
overconsumption of alcohol because th~ State could have regulated prices or
consumption directly. But Langer involved a policy that the state could not
implement by direct regulation without violating a fundamental premise of
the political system. The justices in Langer were careful to determine that
the restriction was "not imposed with a view toward repressing freedom of
political discussion, "82 that the primary objective was to obtain observance
of the voting system, 83 and that the law was "reasonably capable of being
viewed as appropriate and adapted" 84 to that purpose. These comments
suggest that the Australian Court might have viewed the case differently if
there had existed viable alternatives with which to save the validity of ballots
filled out negligently while maintaining a full preferential balloting system.

82. Langer v. Commonwealth, 134 A.L.R. 400, 406 (1996) (Brennan, C.J.).
83. Jd. at 432 (Gummow, J.).
84. [d. at 419 (Toohey & Gaudron, JJ.).
HeinOnline -- 7 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 127 1996-1997

128

IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

[Vol. 7:1

The two cases differ on the deference to be shown the legislature. The
renunciation of Posadas demonstrated that the United States Supreme Court
would reach its own decision with respect to whether the law was
appropriate to accomplish a legitimate end. The Australian judges asked
whether the law was "reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and
adapted to the enhancement of the democratic process, " 85 deferring to the
legislative judgment that it was so appropriate and adapted.
But the different standard may be less significant than it appears.
Given the remoteness of the relationship between high prices aJ?.d
temperance, a court could determine that the Rhode Island law was not even
reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and adapted to the
problem of overconsumption of alcohol. Similarly, even a court applying a
strict standard might conclude that the Australian law was necessary to
accomplish its objective, since direct regulation would violate the secret
ballot.
The core difference between these cases is their view of the legitimate
interests for government. The philosophical gap over the nature of
citizenship is as broad as the Nullarbor Plain and as deep as the Grand
Canyon. The United States begins with the individual while Australia starts
with the community. Of course, U.S. citizens have duties toward their
government Gury service, tax payment, military service, etc.), and
Australians have individual rights (common law, statutory, and
constitutional). 86 Nevertheless, the initial premises for government differ in
each nation.
The U.S. Constitution bristles with individual rights that reflect a deep
suspicion of abusive government power. 87 Voting is one of those
rights-protected against government interference by various Constitutional
provisions. 88 But politics is only one area for individual choice. Freedom
85. Id. (Toohey & Gaudron, JJ.).
86. E.g., AUSTL. CONST. §§ 41 (right to vote in Commonwealth election of persons
having right to vote in state elections), 100 (right of state residents to reasonable use of the
waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation), 117 (right of residents in states not to be
discriminated against in other states by reason of residence). Several other specific
prohibitions appear to confer individual rights. E.g., §§ 80 (trial by jury), 92 (trade and
commerce to be free), and 116 (free exercise of religion).
87. The word "right," referring to individual rights, is found throughout the document.
E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I, ll, IV, VI, VII, IX, XV, XIX, XXIV, and XXVI. In addition,
numerous specific limitations on government power effectively confer individual rights. E.g.,
id. art. I,§§ 9, 10; id. art. IV,§ 2; id. amends. I, m, v. vm, XIII, and XIV).
88. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude[,]" U.S. CONST. amend. XV, or "on account of sex[,]" id. amend. XIX, or "by
reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax[,]" id. amend. XXIV; and "[t]he right of
citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age .... " ld. amend.
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of speech is important to individual choice in all realms of life-in the market
and in social relationships as well as in the political realm. 44 Liquormart
illustrates the broad scope for freedom of speech under the First
Amendment's guarantee. And choice includes refusal to partake. The
nation's history demonstrates that the government can operate without
compelling individuals to participate in the political process, and thus
compulsory voting could never be an appropriate justification for restrictions
on speech in the United States.
In Australia, self-government is not an opportunity but an obligation
of the citizen. There is freedom to discuss all political ideas, but every
citizen has an obligation to vote. A government produced by the vote of
only a fraction of the electorate cannot legitimately be the government of all.
On the other hand, if every individual participates in the creation of the
community, the community can be trusted to protect the rights of the
individual. 89 Langer demonstrates the differences between the two nations'
views of the citizen in the political process. The Australian High Court
protects choice only as an incident of representative government, so
obtaining a fully representative government has to be the highest value.
Protecting a voting system so fundamental to the nation's political theory is
a compelling justification for government action.
The American identity was forged in a revolution against the existing
government. Internal frictions in the United States led to the suppression of
antislavery speech in the South and brought about a civil war. Fears of
communism led to a variety of speech-repressive measures after both World
Wars that subsequently were repudiated to a large extent. Protest
movements against racial discrimination and the war in Vietnam ultimately
succeeded, but that success itself suggested that government had not acted
before in a trustworthy manner. In short, the history and experience of the
United States has reinforced a deep suspicion of the government. Politicians
fmd it useful to run against insiders-Presidents Reagan, Carter, and Clinton
all succeeded in promoting variations on this theme.
Australia enacted its Constitution through British parliamentary
processes. It never broke apart in civil war. The national identity of
Australia was forged in the World War I and II battles against other nations
rather than in internal revolution. Although Australians differ fiercely over
a variety of issues and historically had racially oppressive policies on
immigration and aboriginal rights, Australia does not seem to have developed
the same degree of fear of government as has the United States. The new

XXVI.
89. "Responsible government in a democracy is regarded by us as the ultimate guarantee
of justice and individual rights." SIR ROBERT MENZIES, CENTRAL POWER IN THE
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 54 (1967).
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free speech protections reflect a recognition of the need to protect freedom
within the political process, but those protections exist within a community
united by a very different vision of the citizen's place.
In the end, it may be possible for Australians and Americans to discuss
the principles of freedom of speech in a democracy, but, at least for now, the
two countries begin their discussions from significantly different starting
positions. It is hoped that, in calling attention to those differences, this
article will contribute to the dialogue.
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